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Morrison v. Olson: Renewed Acceptance
For a Functional Approach to
Separation of Powers
Introduction
Fundamental constitutional structure divides the United States
Government into three separate entities, namely, the legislative, execu-
tive, and judicial branches.' The Constitution allocates the various func-
tions of creating and enforcing law to the branches in a manner that
ensures that each operates independently of the others, while still main-
taining the interdependence between the branches necessary to avoid sin-
gle domination. The appointed powers of the three branches dovetail, so
that each checks or restrains one or both of the others at various times.2
Among the Constitution's grants of power to the executive is the
function of "tak[ing] Care that the Laws [are] faithfully executed."3 This
grant establishes the executive, through the Attorney General and the
Department of Justice, as the primary enforcer of federal criminal law.4
As such, an apparent conflict of interest arises when the executive is re-
quired to pursue criminal allegations against one of its own officials.
Concerns quickly arise regarding the fairness and impartiality of such in-
house investigations and prosecutions.
In an attempt to address this problem, Congress enacted the Ethics
1. U.S. CONST. arts. I, II, III; F.A. OGG & P.O. RAY, INTRODUCTION To AMERICAN
GOVERNMENT: THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT 239-40 (6th ed. 1938). "All legislative Pow-
ers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States .... U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 1. "The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America."
U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 1. "The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one
supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
2. The Senate was given the power to confirm or reject the President's appointments and
to approve or disapprove the ratification of his treaties. Congress, as a whole, was granted the
right to make or withhold appropriations required to carry out executive policies. The Presi-
dent was entrusted with the power to veto nearly every kind of measure passed by the two
houses. The courts, by implication, were allowed the right to pass upon the constitutionality,
and therefore the enforceability, of acts of Congress, and also to review administrative acts of
officers belonging to the executive branch. F.A. OGG & P.O. RAY, supra note 1, at 240.
3. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
4. "[T]he Executive Branch has exclusive authority and absolute discretion to decide
whether to prosecute a case .. " United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693 (1974) (citations
omitted) (dictum).
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in Government Act of 1978 (Ethics Act),5 which provides a procedure
for the appointment of an independent counsel to examine allegations of
criminal wrongdoing by designated high-level executive officials. The
separation-of-powers concerns implicated by this provision were at issue
in Morrison v. Olson.6 In June 1988, a seven-to-one majority of the
Supreme Court found the Act constitutional, holding that the Ethics Act
did not sanction impermissible interference with executive functions.7
This Comment will examine the separation-of-powers concerns
raised by the Ethics Act and the Court's attempt to resolve these con-
cerns in Morrison v. Olson. Part I summarizes the provisions of the Eth-
ics Act.' Part II sets forth the existing law regarding separation-of-
powers challenges.9 This Part acknowledges, as previous scholars have
noted, two distinct standards the Supreme Court has applied, one rigid
and formal, the other flexible and functional.10 Part III describes the
facts and holding of Morrison v. Olson.1" Finally, Part IV focuses on
Morrison's contribution to resolving the competing approaches surround-
ing separation-of-powers questions. 2
This Comment concludes that Morrison suggests that the Court will
follow a flexible, functional approach to separation-of-powers questions
when no branch of government is clearly encroaching upon the constitu-
tionally assigned powers of another. This Comment further concludes
that the Morrison holding suggests that the Court will reserve a rigid,
formalistic approach for separation-of-powers questions involving one
branch "aggrandizing" 13 itself with the constitutional functions of an-
other branch.
5. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 49, 591-599 (West Supp. 1988).
6. 108 S. Ct. 2597 (1988).
7. Id. at 2620-21.
8. See infra notes 14-40 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 41-66 and accompanying text.
10. See Bruff, On the Constitutional Status of the Administrative Agencies, 36 AM. U.L.
REV. 491, 495-96 (1987); Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation-of-Powers
Questions - A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 488 (1987).
11. See infra notes 67-117 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 118-135 and accompanying text.
13. The Court first used the term "aggrandize" in relation to separation-of-powers ques-
tions in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 654 (1952) (Burton, J., con-
curring). As used in this Comment, the term reflects the meaning most recently construed as
one branch of government attempting to increase its powers at the expense of a coordinate
branch. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 850 (1986) (quoting
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 122 (1976)).
I. The Ethics in Government Act of 1978
A. Recurring Confrontations Led to Congressional Action
Five of the last nine presidential administrations have encountered
serious allegations of criminal wrongdoing by high-level officers of the
executive branch. 4 When such allegations arise, a conflict of interest
emerges within the executive branch between the Department of Justice
and the official against whom the allegations are directed. The Attorney
General, as head of the Justice Department, finds himself in the inher-
ently conflicting roles of the nation's chief law enforcement officer and
the accused administration's highest ranking legal advisor. 15
The Watergate scandal most graphically illustrated the unique
problems this conflict of interest presents.16 In response to the investiga-
tive and prosecutorial problems encountered during Watergate, Congress
enacted the Ethics in Government Act of 1978.17 Congress enacted the
14. See In re Olson, 818 F.2d 34, 39-43 (D.C. Cir. 1987), rep'dsub nom. In re Sealed Case,
838 F.2d 476 (D.C. Cir. 1988), rev'd sub nom. Morrison v. Olson, 108 S. Ct. 2597 (1988)
(noting allegations of criminal activity in the administrations of Presidents Truman, Eisen-
hower, Nixon, Carter, and Reagan).
15. See Bruff, Independent Counsel and the Constitution, 24 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 539,
541-42 (1988).
16. The scandal began with the break in at the Democratic National Committee head-
quarters in the Watergate office complex on June 17, 1972. Five men were arrested and later
determined to be agents of the Committee to Re-Elect the President. Shortly thereafter, news-
paper reports circulated alleging that those arrested had been paid hush-money by executive
branch officials. On April 30, 1973, President Nixon accepted the resignations of Chief of Staff
H.R. Halderman, John Ehrlichman (White House assistant for domestic affairs), John W.
Dean III (Presidential counsel), and Attorney General Richard G. Kleindiest. All four re-
signing officials were later convicted for their involvement in the Watergate cover-up. Presi-
dent Nixon himself resigned in 1974.
The conviction of the four resigning officials was obtained through the appointment of a
special prosecutor, but not before what became known as the "Saturday Night Massacre."
Shortly after the resignations, President Nixon announced his willingness to have Attorney
General-Designate Eliot Richardson appoint a special prosecutor, if Richardson deemed it
necessary to ensure an impartial investigation into Watergate. Richardson appointed Archi-
bald Cox, who was sworn in on May 25, 1973. During the course of the investigation, Cox
insisted that President Nixon relinquish tapes, notes, and memoranda of presidential conversa-
tions. As a result, Nixon ordered the Attorney General to remove Cox. Instead of complying
with this presidential order, Richardson resigned. Subsequently, Deputy Attorney General
William Ruckelshaus was ordered to remove Cox, refused, and was terminated. Acting Attor-
ney General Robert Bork finally carried out Nixon's order. Special Prosecutor Cox was then
replaced by Leon Jaworski, who ultimately obtained the convictions. See generally J.A.
LUKAS, NIGHTMARE: THE UNDERSIDE OF THE NIXON YEARS, (1976); C. BERNSTEIN & B.
WOODWARD, ALL THE PRESIDENT'S MEN (1974).
17. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 49, 591-599 (West Supp. 1988); S. REP. No. 170, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess., 3 (1977). The Ethics Act was reauthorized in 1983 and amended to refer to the "special
prosecutor" as "independent counsel." Ethics in Government Act Amendments of 1982, Pub.
L. No. 97-409, § 2(b)(l), 96 Stat. 2039 (1983). The Ethics Act was again reauthorized in 1987.
Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-191, 101 Stat. 1293
(1987).
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Ethics Act "to preserve and promote the accountability and integrity of
public officers and of the institutions of the Federal Government and to
invigorate the Constitutional separation of powers between the three
branches of Government."18
B. Summary of the Ethics Act
Title VI of the Ethics Act establishes procedures by which a special
federal court appoints an independent counsel at the request of the At-
torney General- to investigate and, if necessary, prosecute certain high-
level executive officials accused of misconduct. I9 The Ethics Act directs
the Attorney General's office to conduct a preliminary investigation into
a "sufficiently grounded" allegation of criminal wrongdoing by a high-
level executive official.2 ° During this preliminary investigation, the At-
torney General's authority is limited and the office is without some of its
normal investigatory tools and means of leverage such as grand juries,
plea bargaining, grants of immunity, and subpoenas.2'
If, after this preliminary investigation, the Attorney General finds
that "no reasonable grounds" exist for further investigation, the matter
ends and no judicial review is available.22 Should the Attorney General
find grounds for further investigation, he must then apply to a specially
appointed division of the federal court, the Special Division, which will
appoint an independent counsel to continue the investigation and, if nec-
essary, prosecute the executive official in question. 23 The Attorney Gen-
18. S. REP. No. 170, supra note 17, at 1.
19. See infra notes 20-28.
20. Executive officials subject to such an investigation include the President, the Vice
President, the Cabinet, as well as principal officials in the Department of Justice, the Central
Intelligence Agency, and the Presidential campaign committee. 28 U.S.C.A. § 591(b) (West
Supp. 1988). The Ethics Act encompasses all violations of federal criminal law other than a
violation classified as a Class B or C misdemeanor or an infraction. 28 U.S.C.A. § 591(c)(1).
The Attorney General must determine within 15 days whether sufficient grounds to inves-
tigate exist. 28 U.S.C.A. § 591(d)(2). 28 U.S.C.A. § 591(d) lists the specificity of the informa-
tion and the credibility of the source of information as factors for the Attorney General to
consider when determining whether sufficient grounds to investigate exist. No judicial review
is available for the decision not to investigate. 28 U.S.C.A. § 592(f). If the Attorney General
determines that the allegation constitutes sufficient grounds to investigate, he must conduct
this preliminary investigation within 90 days. 28 U.S.C.A. § 592(a)(1).
21. 28 U.S.C.A. § 592(2).
22. 28 U.S.C.A. § 592(b)(1), (f). As a result of the 1987 amendment, effective December
15, 1987, the standard for the appointment of independent counsel is "reasonable grounds to
believe further investigation or prosecution is warranted .. " Id., as amended by Independent
Counsel Reauthorization Act of 1987, Pub. L. 100-191, 101 Stat. 1293 (1987) (emphasis
added).
23. 28 U.S.C.A. § 592(c). The Special Division consists of three judges designated by the
Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court. One judge must be from the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia and each will serve for a two-year term. 28
U.S.C.A. § 49.
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eral's application to the special court must include sufficient information
to assist the court both in selecting an independent counsel and in defin-
ing the independent counsel's prosecutorial jurisdiction.24
At this point, the Attorney General and the executive branch's di-
rect power and influence over the matter in question effectively termi-
nate. The Attorney General and Department of Justice must suspend all
investigation into the matter once the independent counsel is appointed
unless the independent counsel gives written approval for them to con-
tinue.2 5 The Attorney General does retain, though, a restricted power to
remove the independent counsel from office. This removal power is lim-
ited to a "good cause" showing similar to removal restrictions for heads
of independent agencies.2 6 Removal by the Attorney General must be
accompanied by a report to Congress2 7 and is subject to judicial review.28
Similarly, the appointment of an independent counsel ends the Spe-
cial Division's influence over the independent counsel and the matter;
however, the Special Division does retain the power to expand the in-
dependent counsel's jurisdiction (pursuant to a request by the Attorney
24. 28 U.S.C.A. § 592(d), which states:
Any application for the appointment of an independent counsel under this chapter
shall contain sufficient information to assist the division of the court in selecting an
independent counsel and in defining that independent counsel's prosecutorial juris-
diction so that the independent counsel has adequate authority to fully investigate
and prosecute the subject matter and all matters related to that subject matter.
Id.
In defining the independent counsel's prosecutorial jurisdiction, the division of the
court shall assure that the independent counsel has adequate authority to fully inves-
tigate and prosecute the subject matter with respect to which the Attorney General
has requested the appointment of the independent counsel, and all matters related to
that subject matter. Such jurisdiction shall also include the authority to investigate
and prosecute Federal crimes, other than those classified as Class B or C misdemean-
ors or infractions, that may arise out of the investigation or prosecution of the matter
with respect to which the Attorney General's request was made, including perjury,
obstruction of justice, destruction of evidence, and intimidation of witnesses.
28 U.S.C.A. § 593(b)(3).
This jurisdiction can be expanded by the Special Division only upon the request of the
Attorney General. 28 U.S.C.A. § 593(c).
25. 28 U.S.C.A. § 597.
26. 28 U.S.C.A. § 596(a)(1) provides:
An independent counsel appointed under this chapter may be removed from office,
other than by impeachment and conviction, only by the personal action of the Attor-
ney General and only for good cause, physical disability, mental incapacity, or any
other condition that substantially impairs the performance of such independent
counsel's duties.
Id.
An essentially identical limitation on the executive's removal power was upheld in
Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935). In Humphrey's Executor, removal
of the Commissioner of the Federal Trade Commission was limited to "inefficiency, neglect of
duty, or malfeasance in office." Id. at 620. The Court found this restriction justified by a
functional need for independence from executive-branch control. Id. at 629.
27. 28 U.S.C.A. § 596(a)(2).
28. 28 U.S.C.A. § 596(a)(3).
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General) and to appoint a successor in the event of death, incapacity, or
resignation.29 Finally, the Special Division retains a narrow power to
terminate the office of independent counsel should the counsel attempt to
remain in office after his or her duties have ended.30
Once appointed, the independent counsel has broad authority and
autonomy to function within the defined jurisdiction. The independent
counsel acquires the "full power and independent authority to exercise
all investigative and prosecutorial functions and powers of the Depart-
ment of Justice, the Attorney General, and any other officer or employee
of the Department of Justice . . 3 . 1 The Ethics Act expressly estab-
lishes the counsel's independence from the Department of Justice.32
Furthermore, the independent counsel has control over hiring of addi-
tional personnel33 and may also dismiss the action on his or her own
initiative.34
Just as the independent counsel is insulated from the judiciary and
the executive, so is the office removed from congressional influence.
Although certain members of Congress may request that the Attorney
General apply for the appointment of an independent counsel, the Attor-
ney General has no duty to comply with such a request.35 In the absence
of circumstances warranting a congressional request, however, Con-
gress's role is limited to oversight by the appropriate committees.3 6
This oversight consists of receiving such statements and reports on
the activities as the independent counsel "considers appropriate. '37 Of
course, Congress does have the power of impeachment, but that is an
29. 28 U.S.C.A. § 593(c), (e); see supra note 24 and accompanying text.
30. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 596(b)(2), the Special Division may terminate the office of
independent counsel whenever a majority believes the investigation no longer serves a useful
purpose. The power is intended to be extremely narrow in scope. This section "provides for
the unlikely situation where a special prosecutor may try to remain as a special prosecutor
after his responsibilities ... are completed." S. REP. No. 170, supra note 17, at 75.
31. 28 U.S.C.A. § 594(a).
32. 28 U.S.C.A. § 594(i).
33. The independent counsel may appoint, set compensation for, and assign duties for
additional employees that the counsel considers necessary for the purpose of carrying out the
duties of the office of independent counsel. 28 U.S.C.A. § 594(c).
34. The independent counsel may dismiss the action within his or her prosecutorial juris-
diction without conducting an investigation, or at any time before actual prosecution. This
power is limited by the established policies of the Department of Justice. 28 U.S.C.A.
§ 594(g).
35. "The Committee on the Judiciary of either House of the Congress, or a majority of
majority party members or a majority of all nonmajority party members of either such com-
mittee, may request in writing that the Attorney General apply for the appointment of an
independent counsel." 28 U.S.C.A. § 592(g)(1). See supra note 22 and accompanying text for
the Attorney General's lack of a duty to comply with any such request. In the instance of a
congressional request, the Attorney General must submit a report setting forth the reasons for
the decision. 28 U.S.C.A. § 592(g)(2).
36. 28 U.S.C.A. § 595.
37. 28 U.S.C.A. § 595(2).
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independent constitutional grant applying to all officers of the United
States.38
The politically packed "reasonable grounds" standard for the Attor-
ney General's application for the appointment of an independent counsel
clearly erodes some of the executive's prosecutorial power and discretion
when dealing with allegations of criminal wrongdoing by one of its own
officials. This standard is much lower than the probable cause standard
for indictment. Arguably, with such a minimal threshold for application
for appointment, political pressure may be such that the Attorney Gen-
eral loses the freedom to determine whether "reasonable grounds" for
further investigation actually exist. In Morrison v. Olson, though, Attor-
ney General Edwin Meese chose not to initiate action against two of the
accused officials-even against recommendations by Justice Department
officials.39
The judiciary is given power to select and define the prosecutorial
jurisdiction of the independent counsel. Although the Ethics Act re-
quires a nexus between the Attorney General's application and the ac-
tions of the Special Division, one can easily conceive a situation in which
a contemptuous Special Division would disregard the application, opting
for its own judgement in defining jurisdiction. Furthermore, the consti-
tutional validity of Congress vesting such powers in a court of law may
be in question.
Executive-branch power is further eroded by a "good cause" limita-
tion on removal by the Attorney General. This restriction weakens the
executive's control as compared to that in other prosecutorial proce-
dures. Other federal prosecutors, such as the United States Attorneys,
are appointed by the President and subject to termination at will.40
II. Existing Judicial Standards for Separation-of-Powers Cases
As scholars previously have noted, the Supreme Court has applied
two competing approaches in it decisions regarding separation of pow-
ers.4 1 The first is a rigid, formalistic approach advocating three in-
dependent branches of government each with distinct and separate
38. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3.
39. The professional prosecutors of the Justice Department's Public Integrity Section of
the Criminal Division, who had conducted the preliminary investigation, had concluded that
the appointment of an independent counsel was warranted to investigate the conduct of Assis-
tant Attorney General Theodore B. Olson and Deputy Attorney General Edward C. Schmults,
but not for Assistant Attorney General Carol E. Dinkins. Brief for Appellee, In re Sealed
Case, 838 F.2d 476 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (Nos. 87-5261, 87-5264, 87-5265), rev'd sub nom. Morri-
son v. Olson, 108 S. Ct. 2597 (1988), reprinted in 16 HOFSTRA L. REV. 65, 67-68 (1987).
40. Morrison v. Olson, 108 S. Ct. 2597, 2621 n.34.
41. See Bruf, supra note 10, at 495-96; Strauss, supra note 10.
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functions.42 This approach allows no flexibility when one branch at-
tempts to invade the constitutionally appointed role of another branch.
The second is a flexible, functional approach in which the Court
assesses the needs of each branch to protect its core constitutionally ap-
pointed functions.43 The Court then applies a balancing approach,
weighing the necessity for the questioned action against the amount of
likely interference with the branch's functions as prescribed by the
Constitution.
The Court most recently applied the rigid, formalistic approach in
Bowsher v. Synar 4 and INS v. Chadha.45 In Bowsher, the Court ex-
amined the constitutionality of the Balanced Budget and Emergency
Deficit Control Act (Balanced Budget Act)46, popularly known as the
"Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act." A provision of the Balanced Budget
Act gave the Comptroller General "executive" powers of final authority
in targeting federal allocation programs for budget cuts.47 Because Con-
gress had retained the sole authority to remove the Comptroller General,
the Court reasoned that Congress was directly participating in executing
the laws by interfering with the budget duties of the executive.48 The
Court found that this direct control violated the principle of separation
42. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 721-27 (1986) (invalidating congressional at-
tempt to directly control the execution of law by vesting budgetary functions in office under its
control); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951-59 (1983) (congressional veto held to violate legis-
lative process prescribed by Constitution); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S.
579, 587-89 (1952) (finding presidential order for seizure of steel company exceeded presiden-
tial authority, even under extraordinary circumstances); Myers v. United States 272 U.S. 52,
161 (1926) (holding Congress should not have implied powers to participate in functions con-
stitutionally assigned to the executive).
43. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 847-58 (1986)
(holding CFTC assumption of jurisdiction over common-law counterclaims does not violate
Article III of the Constitution); Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Products Co., 473 U.S. 568,
582-93 (1985) (upholding congressional imposition of binding arbitration for participants in
pesticide-registration scheme); Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 748-54 (1982) (finding abso-
lute presidential immunity from private damage claims stemming from official acts); Nixon v.
Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 441-45 (1977) (holding valid congressional power
to regulate disposition of presidential material); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703-07
(1974) (rejecting absolute executive privilege for production of Presidential communications);
Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 628-29 (1935) (upholding congressional
authority to limit the executive's power of removal over members of independent commission).
44. 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
45. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
46. 2 U.S.C.A. §§ 901-909, 921-922 (West Supp. 1988).
47. Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 732-34.
48. The Court equated the removability of an officer to the control of that officer for
constitutional purposes, stating:
By placing the responsibility for execution of the Balanced Budget and Emergency
Deficit Control Act in the hands of an officer who is subject to removal only by itself,
Congress in effect has retained control over the execution of the Act and has intruded
into the executive function. The Constitution does not permit such intrusion.
Id. at 734.
of powers, and thus was unconstitutional.4 9 The Bowsher Court had no
tolerance for the blending of legislative and executive power.
The Court used this same formalistic reasoning earlier in INS v.
Chadha.50 In Chadha, the Court found that the legislative veto author-
ized under the Immigration and Nationality Act (Immigration Act)5 vi-
olated the doctrine of separation of powers. 2 Congress, through the
passage of the Immigration Act, had delegated the power to suspend spe-
cific deportations to the executive branch's Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service, subject, however, to legislative veto by resolution of either
house of Congress 3.5  The Court rejected the argument that the legisla-
tive veto was a useful "political invention," clinging to a formal construc-
tion of the constitutional functions of Congress and the executive in the
legislative process. 4 The Court reasoned:
The Constitution sought to divide the delegated powers of the new
Federal Government into three defined categories, Legislative, Ex-
ecutive, and Judicial, to assure, as nearly as possible, that each
branch of government would confine itself to its assigned responsi-
bilities. The hydraulic pressure inherent within each of the sepa-
rate Branches to exceed the outer limits of its power, even to
accomplish desirable objectives, must be resisted. 5
By contrast, the Court also has applied a flexible, functional ap-
proach to separation-of-powers questions. 6 In Nixon v. Administrator of
General Services,57 the Court addressed a legislative-executive power
struggle. The Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act 58
directed the Administrator of General Services to take custody of former
President Nixon's presidential materials and have government archivists
screen them in order to return to Nixon those materials that were per-
sonal and private in nature and to preserve those having historical
value.59 The Court summarized the functional approach by stating:
[I]n determining whether the Act disrupts the proper balance be-
tween the coordinate branches, the proper inquiry focuses on the
extent to which it prevents the Executive Branch from accomplish-
ing its constitutionally assigned functions. United States v. Nixon,
418 U.S., at 711-712. Only where the potential for disruption is
present must we then determine whether that impact is justified by
49. Id. at 721-36.
50. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
51. 8 U.S.C. § 1254(c)(2) (1982).
52. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 959.
53. 8 U.S.C. § 1254(c)(2).
54. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 945.
55. Id. at 951.
56. See supra note 43.
57. 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
58. 44 U.S.C. § 2107 (1982).
59. Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. at 429.
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an overriding need to promote objectives within the constitutional
authority of Congress.6°
In applying this standard, the Court recognized that no absolute inde-
pendence can exist between separate branches of government. The Court
held that because the Administrator of General Services, an executive
official, screened the documents, the Act was not unduly disruptive of
executive-branch functions.61
On the same day that the Court delivered the formalistic Bowsher
opinion, it applied a functional approach to uphold the Commodity Ex-
change Act (Exchange Act) 62 in Commodity Futures Trading Commis-
sion v. Schor.63 The Exchange Act, which empowered an administrative
agency to hear common-law counterclaims, did not violate the principle
of separation of powers because the encroachment upon constitutionally
appointed judicial functions was "de minimis" and was outweighed by
the need for agency counterclaim jurisdiction. 4 The Court noted that
the agency shared, rather than displaced, federal district court jurisdic-
tion and that the Exchange Act granted jurisdiction only to a very nar-
row class of controversies.6 In Schor, the Court allowed a blending of
the constitutionally appointed functions allocated to the different
branches, again recognizing that the separation-of-powers inquiry must
be guided by " 'practical attention to substance rather than doctrinaire
reliance on formal categories .. ".."''66
III. Morrison v. Olson
A. Facts of the Case
Morrison v. Olson 67 arose from a confrontation between the legisla-
ture and the executive over documents the executive attempted to with-
hold from House subcommittees investigating the Environmental
Protection Agency's (EPA) Superfund hazardous waste cleanup pro-
gram.68 In 1982, President Reagan, acting on advice of the Justice De-
partment, claimed executive privilege to prevent the production of the
EPA documents, reasoning that their release could imperil ongoing EPA
enforcement actions. 69 This privilege claim was later abandoned when
the withheld documents were found to contain evidence of political ma-
60. Id. at 443.
61. Id. at 441-45.
62. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-26 (1982).
63. 478 U.S. 833, 847-58 (1986).
64. Id. at 851-57.
65. Id. at 852-53.
66. Id. at 848 (quoting Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Products Co., 473 U.S. 568, 587
(1985)).
67. 108 S. Ct. 2597 (1988).
68. Id. at 2605.
69. Brief for Appellee, supra note 39.
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nipulation of the Superfund program.7"
The House Committee on the Judiciary began an investigation into
the Justice Department's role in the controversy over these EPA docu-
ments. 71 As part of this investigation, Assistant Attorney General Theo-
dore B. Olson testified before a House subcommittee on March 10, 1983.
In 1985, the House Judiciary Committee published a report72 on the role
of the Justice Department in the EPA documents controversy, suggesting
that Olson testified untruthfully before the subcommittee and that Dep-
uty Attorney General Edward C. Schmults and Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral Carol E. Dinkins had obstructed the Committee's inquiry.73
The House forwarded its report to the Attorney General with a for-
mal request, pursuant to the Ethics Act,74 that the Attorney General
seek the appointment of independent counsel. 75 The Attorney General,
after the preliminary investigation was completed, found that appoint-
ment of independent counsel was warranted for Olson, but not for either
Schmults or Dinkins. 76 As a result, the Special Division appointed as
independent counsel James C. McKay, who later resigned and was re-
placed by Alexia Morrison. 7
The independent counsel's original jurisdiction was interpreted to
include inquiry into whether Olson may have conspired with others, in-
cluding Schmults and Dinkins, to obstruct the Committee's investiga-
tion.78 Independent Counsel Morrison then caused the grand jury to
subpoena Olson, Schmults, and Dinkins. 79 Each moved to quash the
subpoenas, "claiming, among other things, that the independent counsel
provisions of the [Ethics] Act were unconstitutional and [therefore] that
[the independent counsel] had no authority to proceed."8
In upholding the constitutionality of the Ethics Act, the district
court denied the motions and held Olson, Schmults, and Dinkins in con-
tempt for continuing to refuse to comply with the subpoenas.8' The
court of appeals reversed in a split decision, finding that the Act violated
the Constitution's Appointments Clause and principles of separation of
70. Id.
71. Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2605.
72. H.R. REP. No. 435, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985).
73. Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2606.
74. 28 U.S.C.A. § 592(g) (West Supp. 1988).
75. Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2606.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. In re Olson, 818 F.2d 34, 47-48 (D.C. Cir. 1987), rev'd sub nom. In re Sealed Case,
838 F.2d 476 (D.C. Cir. 1988), rev'd sub nom. Morrison v. Olson, 108 S. Ct. 2597 (1988).
79. Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2607.
80. Id.
81. In re Sealed Case, 665 F. Supp. 56 (D.D.C. 1987), rev'd, 838 F.2d 476 (D.C. Cir.
1988), rev'd sub nom. Morrison v. Olson, 108 S. Ct. 2597 (1988).
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powers.82 The United States Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction
for appeal in February of 1988.83
B. Holding and Reasoning of the Supreme Court
1. Majority Opinion
A majority of seven justices found the Ethics Act constitutional in
the face of three separate challenges.84 First, the Court found that the
Ethics Act did not violate the Appointments Clause of the Constitu-
tion. 5 Second, the Court held that the Ethics Act did not violate Article
III of the Constitution, under which executive or administrative duties of
a nonjudicial nature may not be imposed on Article III judges.8 6 Finally,
the Court reasoned that the Ethics Act did not violate separation-of-pow-
ers principles by impermissibly interfering with the constitutionally ap-
pointed functions of the executive branch.87
a. Appointments Clause Challenge
The Constitution's Appointments Clause provides for Presidential
nomination and Senate confirmation of "principal" officers of the United
States.88 Olson had claimed that the appointment of the independent
counsel should conform to this mandate because the powers granted to
the independent counsel make the office subordinate to no one, and
therefore not "inferior."8 9 In holding the Ethics Act consistent with the
Appointments Clause, the Court reasoned that the independent counsel
was an "inferior" officer of the United States and as such did not need to
be appointed by the President with the consent of the Senate.90 The
Court found that although the independent counsel is not necessarily
subordinate to the Attorney General, the office is ultimately subject to
82. In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d 476 (D.C. Cir. 1988), rev'd sub nom. Morrison v. Olson,
108 S. Ct. 2597 (1988). U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 provides:
[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the
Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of
the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments
are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law; but the
Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think
proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.
83. Morrison v. Olson, 108 S. Ct. 1010 (1988), prob. juris. noted.
84. Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens, and O'Connor joined Chief
Justice Rehnquist's opinion. Justice Scalia filed a dissenting opinion. Justice Kennedy did not
participate in the decision. Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2602.
85. Id. at 2609-11.
86. Id. at 2615.
87. Id. at 2620-22.
88. See supra note 82.
89. Brief on Behalf of Amicus Curiae United States, In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d 476
(D.C. Cir. 1988) (Nos. 87-5261, 87-5264, 87-5265), rev'd sub nom. Morrison v. Olson, 108 S.
Ct. 2597 (1988), reprinted in 16 HOFSTRA L. REV. 97, 102-03 (1987).
90. Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2608.
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removal by the Attorney General and therefore should be considered
inferior.91
The Court also considered other factors, first introduced in United
States v. Germaine, 92 in finding the independent counsel an inferior of-
ficer.93 These factors included the independent counsel's limited duties,
the office's limited jurisdiction, and its limited tenure.94 Of determinative
consideration was that the independent counsel had no "authority to for-
mulate policy for the Government or the Executive Branch."95 The
Court used a plain reading of the Appointments Clause in authorizing
interbranch appointments according to which officers of one branch ap-
point an officer of another. 96
b. Article III Challenge
Article III, in an effort to "ensure the independence of the Judicial
Branch and to prevent the judiciary from encroaching into areas reserved
for the other branches," expressly limits judicial power to "Cases and
Controversies." 97 The Court in Morrison acknowledged the general rule
that " 'executive or administrative duties of a nonjudicial nature may not
be imposed upon judges holding office under Art[icle] III of the Constitu-
tion,' "91 but stressed that the Appointments Clause is a source of au-
thority for judicial appointment independent from Article I1. 9' In
addition, the Court found that neither the miscellaneous powers granted
to the Special Division under the Ethics Act, nor its restricted power to
terminate the independent counsel, constituted an impermissible judicial
intrusion upon the authority of the executive branch."°
c. Separation of Powers
Finally, the Court found that the Ethics Act did not violate the prin-
ciple of separation of powers because the Act did not allow either Con-
91. Id.
92. 99 U.S. 508 (1878).
93. Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2608-09.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 2609-11.
97. Id. at 2611-12.
98. Id. at 2612 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 123 (1976) (citing United States v.
Ferreira, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 40 (1852); Hayburn's Case 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792))).
99. [A]ccept[ing] that the Appointments Clause gives Congress the power to vest the
appointment of officials such as the independent counsel in the "courts of Law,"
there can be no Article III objection to the Special Division's exercise of that power,
as the power itself derives from the Appointments Clause, a source of authority for
judicial action that is independent of Article III.
Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2612.
100. Id.
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gress or the judiciary to significantly usurp executive functions. 0 The
Court distinguished Morrison from Myers v. United States'1z and Bow-
sher v. Synar, °3 both of which involved attempts by Congress to "ag-
grandize" itself with the constitutionally assigned functions of the
executive."0 The Court found that the Act gave Congress no control or
supervision over the independent counsel; the only involvement Congress
has in the process is the power of some of its members to request that the
Attorney General apply for an independent counsel and to receive re-
ports when the independent counsel decides the reports are
appropriate. 10 5
Likewise, the Court held that the judicial branch had not adopted
extensive executive functions.'0 6 The Special Division has no power to
order a sua sponte appointment of independent counsel; it must await a
request from the Attorney General.'07 When an independent counsel ap-
pointment is requested, the grant of jurisdiction is determined by the At-
torney General's application."0 8 The judiciary is not empowered to
examine the Attorney General's decision not to apply for an independent
counsel.'0 9 Again, the Court found the judiciary, like Congress, had no
direct control or supervision over the independent counsel once
appointed.
The Court noted that the "good cause" limitation on removal by the
Attorney General has eroded some executive control over investigation
and prosecution, but held that the necessity for independence from the
executive required that removability be limited and that the judiciary se-
lect and appoint the independent counsel."O This limitation and the
other provisions of the Ethics Act were found not to be so restrictive as
to keep the executive branch from accomplishing its constitutionally as-
signed functions of "tak[ing] Care that the Laws be faithfully exe-
cuted."" ' The Court reexpressed the view that the Constitution
" 'enjoins upon its branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy
but reciprocity.' "" In sum, the Court found that the Ethics Act, taken
as a whole, did not disrupt the Constitution's proper balance of power
among the three branches of government.
101. Id. at 2620-21.
102. 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
103. 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
104. Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2617-20, 2618 nn.26, 28.
105. Id. at 2620.
106. Id. at 2621.
107. 28 U.S.C.A. § 593 (West Supp. 1988); see also supra note 23 and accompanying text.
108. See supra note 24.
109. 28 U.S.C.A. § 592(b) (West Supp. 1988).
110. Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2619-20.
111. U.S. CONST. art II, § 3; Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2621.
112. Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2620 (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343
U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring)).
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2 Dissenting Opinion
Justice Scalia summarized his strong but lone dissent in a nine-min-
ute oration at the time the Court issued the decision."' According to
Scalia, the Ethics Act violated the principle of separation of powers be-
cause Article II, Section 1, Clause 1 of the Constitution requires that all
purely executive power be under the complete control of that branch.'14
He stated that the constitutional grant of executive power "does not
mean some of the executive power, but all of the executive power....
Governmental investigation and prosecution of crimes is a quintessen-
tially executive function."'" Therefore, Scalia reasoned, the good cause
limitation on removal power strips the executive of prosecutorial discre-
tion and intolerably weakens the executive." 6 To ensure the faithful exe-
cution of law, Justice Scalia would seem to require a unitary executive
with plenary power and control over all investigation and prosecution.' '7
IV. The Court's Choice of Analysis
In the past, the Court has provided little guidance to direct which
approach to use in deciding separation-of-powers controversies. When
deciding legislative-executive confrontations, the Court has used both ap-
proaches almost interchangeably."' Arguably, the Court makes an ad
hoc decision about how it will rule and then later chooses the theory or
approach most appropriate for that result. Notably, each time the Court
has applied the rigid, formalistic approach, it has invalidated the legisla-
tion, " 9 and each time the Court has used a flexible, functional approach,
it has upheld the legislation. 20
A. The Dissent's Formalistic Approach
Justice Scalia, in his Morrison dissent, applied the rigid, formalistic
approach exemplified by Bowsher and Chadha. He argued for an in-
dependent, unitary executive, interpreting the constitutional grants of
113. Justice Scalia, in his rare oral summation of his dissent, called the Morrison decision
"one of the most important opinions the Court has issued in many years." N.Y. Times, July 3,
1988, at 1, col. 2.
114. Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2626-28 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
115. Id. at 2626-27 (emphasis in original).
116. Id. at 2628.
117. Id. at 2628-29.
118. In Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983);
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952); and Myers v. United States,
272 U.S. 52 (1926), the Court applied the formalistic test. In Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.
731 (1982); Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425 (1977); United States v.
Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974); and Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935),
the Court opted for a functional approach to separation-of-powers concerns.
119. See supra note 42.
120. See supra note 43.
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power to the executive as complete and absolute. 121 Any sharing of con-
stitutionally appointed power would appear to be intolerable under this
view.
Scalia's inflexible position is understandable (or at least predictable)
in the light of his earlier opinions involving constitutional construction.
Before appointment to the Supreme Court, Scalia had questioned the
constitutionality of independent regulatory agencies, the so-called fourth
branch of government with no express constitutional authority to legis-
late. 22 In addition, as a Supreme Court Justice in Young v. United
States,123 Scalia applied a strict construction of the Constitution to inter-
pret the district court's article III judicial power. Scalia found that the
district court had exceeded its constitutional power by appointing the
interested party's counsel as special counsel to prosecute the contempt of
an injunction issued earlier by the court.1 24 In Scalia's view, judicial
power includes "the power to serve as a neutral adjudicator .. but does
not include the power to seek out law violators in order to punish them
"125
Justice O'Connor recently discussed appropriate application of the
formalistic approach, as advocated by Scalia and used by the Court in
Bowsher, in the majority opinion for Schor, and apparently limited it to
controversies involving Congress "aggrandizing" itself with the constitu-
tional powers of another branch.1 26 The majority opinion in Morrison
repeated this qualification. Chief Justice Rehnquist stated, "Unlike both
Bowsher and Myers, this case does not involve an attempt by Congress
itself to gain a role in the removal of executive officials other than its
established powers of impeachment and conviction. The Act instead
puts the removal power squarely in the hands of the Executive Branch
.. "127 Accordingly, after Morrison, a clear majority of the Supreme
Court seems to accept the notion of limiting the formalistic approach to
aggrandizement problems.1 28
Such a limitation also finds historical backing. "The framers knew
that '[t]he accumulation of all powers, Legislative, Executive, and Judici-
ary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether
121. Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2626 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
122. Lazarus & Larson, The Constitutionality of the Independent Counsel Statute, 25 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 187, 192 n.22 (1987). Scalia, in dicta, questioned the constitutionality of the
concept of regulatory agencies in Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 1374, 1399-1400 nn.28-
29 (D.D.C. 1986), aff'd sub nom. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986). For a discussion of
Bowsher, see supra notes 44, 46-49 and accompanying text.
123. Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton Et Fils S.A., 107 S. Ct. 2124 (1987) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in judgment).
124. Id. at 2141-42.
125. Id.
126. Commodities Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 856-57 (1986).
127. Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2616.
128. See Strauss, supra note 10.
hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very
definition of tyranny.' "129 But, this very limiting to instances of "ag-
grandizement" creates its own dilemma. Aggrandizement is a com-
pletely subjective standard. As one scholar has noted, "Aggrandizement
lies in the eyes of the beholder."' 3 Thus, the danger still exists that the
court may decide a case at first glance and develop a rationale of aggran-
dizement later.
The full implications of the danger of limiting the formalistic ap-
proach to aggrandizement cases remains untested. The Morrison deci-
sion sheds little light on the dangers inherent in such a subjective
standard because no clear argument for aggrandizement existed in Morri-
son. Even Scalia, in his formalistic approach, did not argue that Con-
gress or the judiciary was aggrandizing itself with executive functions.
Instead, he focused on complete separation of the three branches of gov-
ernment. Although the independent counsel may be considered aggran-
dizing itself with the executive functions of investigation and
prosecution, neither Congress nor the judiciary had sufficient control
over the office to raise the concerns found in Bowsher. In fact, Scalia
never cited Bowsher in his dissent.
B. Functional Approach
The Court in Morrison clearly applied a functional, balancing ap-
proach in finding that the Ethics Act did not unduly interfere with the
executive branch's ability to execute its constitutionally assigned func-
tions."3 The Court's decision in Morrison should not be interpreted,
however, as a broad grant of discretion to Congress to encroach upon the
functions of other branches by the creation of independent entities. Ap-
parently, the need must be significant and the intrusion minor for the
Court to uphold any such enactment. Instead, the Morrison decision is
best viewed as a limited, narrow application of separation-of-powers
principles to a specific, yet recurring problem of conflicting interests in
the executive branch.
The focus of the Court's analysis in Morrison was upon the small
magnitude of the independent counsel's intrusion upon the executive
branch functions of investigation and prosecution. The significant need
for independence and impartiality in examining allegations of criminal
wrongdoing by high-level executive-branch officials validated this intru-
sion. Again, notably, neither Congress nor the judiciary had significant
control or influence over the independent counsel, and the executive re-
129. Schor, 478 U.S. at 859-60 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 46,
at 334 (J. Madison) (H. Dawson ed. 1876)).
130. Bruff, supra note 15, at 547.
131. Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2616-21.
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tained control over removal.1 32
Even after Morrison, no clear guidelines for separation-of-powers
concerns exist. Perhaps none should exist. As Justice O'Connor stated
in the Schor majority, "Although such [clear] rules might lend a greater
degree of coherence to this area of the law, they might also unduly con-
strict Congress' ability to take needed and innovative action pursuant to
its Article I powers."1 33
What Morrison does provide, though, is strong support for a func-
tional approach to separation-of-powers questions when no aggrandize-
ment exists. A majority of seven justices, each of whom (excepting
Justice White) had joined at least one of the Court's recent formalistic
opinions, applied a functional approach to the legislative-executive con-
frontation in Morrison.134
Given the persistence of the "aggrandizement" problem, however,
similar questions of separation of powers must be approached on a case-
by-case basis.' 35 Each case's unique factors should be independently ex-
amined and balanced against competing interests. Only when one
branch is obviously aggrandizing another branch's power will the result
be remotely predictable.
Conclusion
The Ethics in Government Act of 1978 was a legislative answer to a
recurring executive problem, the conflict of interest arising when the ex-
ecutive must investigate and prosecute one of its own high-level officials.
The Ethics Act's provision for the judicial appointment of an independ-
ent counsel to examine the matter addressed this conflict. The appointed
counsel is truly an "independent" counsel, isolated from direct influence
by either the executive, the judiciary, or the legislature.
The Supreme Court's upholding of the Ethics Act in Morrison v.
Olson sheds light on the morass of law encompassing the Constitution's
doctrine of separation of powers. The majority applied a flexible, func-
tional analysis in holding the Ethics Act constitutional. Although the
Court found that the appointment of an independent counsel did en-
croach somewhat upon the constitutionally assigned executive functions
of investigation and prosecution, the need for independence and imparti-
ality outweighed this intrusion. The majority's adoption of a flexible,
balancing approach signals a renewed commitment to this analysis, espe-
132. See supra notes 29-30, 36-37 and accompanying text.
133. Schor, 478 U.S. at 851.
134. The Bowsher majority included current Justices Brennan and Rehnquist, with Stevens
and Marshall concurring. 478 U.S. at 716. In Chadha, current Justices Marshall, Stevens,
O'Connor, Brennan, and Blackmun joined in the majority. 462 U.S. at 922.
135. Schor, 478 U.S. at 851. -
MORRISON V OLSON
cially in instances in which no branch of government is directly partici-
pating in the constitutionally allocated powers of another branch.
Morrison continued to distinguish the rigid, formalistic approach
adopted in earlier Court decisions regarding separation of powers. After
Morrison, this approach seems to be reserved for instances in which one
branch attempts to aggrandize itself with another branch's power. Un-
fortunately, limiting this approach to aggrandizement merely begs the
question of "aggrandizement" that Morrison left unaddressed. The
Court's holding in Morrison does suggest, however, solid support for a
functional approach to separation of powers when no aggrandizement
exists.
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